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Abstract
This paper derives the value of PBGCpension insurance under two scenarios
of interest. The first allows forvoluntary plan termination, which aooars
to be legal under current statutes. In thesecond scenario, termination is
prohibited unless the firm is bankrupt. Optimal
pension funding strategy
under each scenario is examined. Finally,empirical estimates of PBGC
liabilities are calculated. These show thata small number of funds account
for a large fraction of totalprospective PBGC liabilities, that those total
liabilities greatly exceed current PBGCreserves for plan terminations, and








CORPORATEPENSION POLICY AN!) THE VALUE OF PBGC INSURANCE
Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 197'
established the Pension Benefit uarantee Corporation to insure the benefits
of participants of defined-benefit pension plans. The PBGC now insures the
pension benefits of more than 28 million employees in single-employer plans,
and provides less extensive coverage to participants in multi-employerplans.
irms initially were charged a premium of Z1 per yearper employee for this
coverage. This premium structure was meant to be temporary, until the data
required to establish an actuarially balanced plan became available. In 1930,
the PBGC raised the premiums to 2.6O per employeeper year. In 1932 the °BGC
requested a further increase in the premium rate to 6.OO, and warned that
even this increase will be sufficient to cover prospective PBSC liabilities
only if several currently precarious large plans regain financial
stability.1 This latest request has led to renewed interest in PBGCpricing
policy and the assessment of BGC liabilities. Although the Multieniployer
Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1930 directed the PBGC to study the possibility
of a graduated premium rate schedule based on risk, such recommendations have
yet to he made, and the current proposals for rate changes are still
independent of risk.
One approach to valuing PBGC liabilities is provided by the options
pricing framework. The formal correspondence between put options and term
insurance policies has long been noted and the option pricing methodology has
been used to value insurance plans in other contexts (Mayers and Smith [1977],
Merton [1977], Sosin [1981], Marcus and Shaked [1932]).In fact several—3—
authors (Sharpe 1:1976], Treynor [1977], da Motta [1979], Langetieg et al.
[1981]) already have used option pricing methodology to study the valuation of
PBGO insurance. The provisions of ERIS allow firms to transfer their pension
liabilities to the BGC in return for pension fund assets plus 30 percent of
the market value of the firm's net worth. Thus, viewing PBGC insurance as a
put option, the pension liabilities play the role of the exercise price while
the fund assets plus 30 percent of net worth play the role of the underlying
asset or stock price.2
However, while the analogy between put options and the option to terminate
a pension plan appears straightforward, the correspondence between the two is
not at all clear with respect to the effective time to maturity of the pension
put. Taken literally, ERISA rules seem to imply that a firm may terminate an
underfunded plan, transfer its net liability to the PBGC, and reestablish a
new insured plan. Under this reading of the law, firms would immediately
terminate any plan which became underfunded by more than 30 percent of net
worth. The option would have instantaneous maturity and be indefinitely
renewable.
In practice, however, virtually all terminations of underfunded pension
plans occur as a byproduct of corporate bankruptcy. The lac< of voluntary
terminations suggests that there may be hidden costs to termination. Bulow
(1932) suggests that voluntary termination might lead to unfavorable
government treatment in other matters.3 Other observers (e.g., Munnell,
1982) cite damaged labor relations as an implicit cost of termination. This
seems less convincing, however, since the firm may replace the terminated plan
with another plan of equal value. Both employees and employers can gain at
the expense of the PBGC. More explicit costs of termination might arise—
fromlegal entanglements. In one widely cited case, the PBGC brought suit to
block the voluntary termination and reorganization of the underfunded pension
plan of AlloyTek. The two sides ultimately settled out of court in 1981, with
the PBGC assuming theunderfundedplan and lloyTek agreeing not to establish
a new defined—benefit plan. Instead, thefirm wasallowed to establish a
defined—contribution plan for its employees y buying Individual etirement
Accounts (IRAs) for them (Munell, 198?).
Most authors have chosen to avoid the ambiguity regarding termination
provisions. Treynor (1977) analyzes pension finance using a one-period model,
in which the fund automatically terminates at the end of the period. Sharpe
(1975) also uses a one-period model, which effectively transforms the
termination put into a European option. In a similar vein, da Motta (1979)
assumes an arbitrary finite maturity date. His model allows firms to drop out
of the PBGC insurance program at interim loments when pension funding payments
come due, but the firmcannotexercise the PBGC put until an exogenously given
maturity date (p. 93). Harrison and Sharpe (1982) also study a multiperiod
model in which the PBGC insurance is exercised only at the end of the last
period. Bulow (1931, 1983), Bulow and Scholes (1982) and Bulow, Scholes and
Menell (1982) generally pass over the issue of termination date per Se, and
focus instead on contingent liabilities at termination, whenever that maybe.
Finally, Langetieg et al. (1981) consider P3GGinsurancein a general
multiperiod contingent claims framework, but examine only the qualitative
properties of the insurance, and do not derive a valuation function for the
insurance.
While these models offer several important insights, the issue of the
implicit termination date remains problematic. It is clear that any estimates—5--
ofthe value of °BGC liabilities will be sensitive to the assumed maturity of
the insurance program. The sensitivity of the qualitative conclusions of
these models to the imposition of an exogenous termination date remains an
open question.
This paper presents models of the pension insurance program which also use
the contingent claims methodology, hut which do not impose an exogenous
maturity date on PBGC insurance. The value of PBGC insurance is derived for
two scenarios. In the first, the possibility of corporate ban'ruptcy is ruled
out, and the pension plan is terminated only when that action is value
maximizing for the firm. This scenario is motivated by the opportunity for
profitable termination which ERISA seems to offer firms. The point of
departure for this model is the AlloyTek case, the resolution of which
indicates that a firm can terminate a pension plan with minimum explicit cost
once, but only once. A one-time-only termination provision makes the pension
put formally identical to an infinite maturity American option, which expires
only upon exercise. The cost of termination is the opportunity cost of not
being able to terminate in the future for possible greater benefits. The
termination decision becomes an optimal-timing problem in which the option is
exercised only if it is sufficiently in-the-money. Such a model potentially
can explain the existence of so many underfunded plans which have not yet
terminated without resorting to unspecified implicit costs of termination.
Given the ability of a firmtoreplace the terminated defined-benefit plan
with a defined-contribution plan, itisnot clear that those costs would be
significant for most firms.
The first model yields an upper bound estimate of the value of PT3GO
insurancebecause the plan is terminated only when that action is optimal for—5-
the firm. In contrast, the second model will provide a lower bound on the
value of the PBGC insurance. In this model, an underfunded pension plan may
terminate only at the occurrence of corporate bankruptcy. The motivation for
this approach is twofold: First, it is consistent with the empirical fact
that virtually no solvent firms exercise the pension put. Second, it is
consistent with proposals for pension insurance reform which would disallow
terminationof underfunded plans by solvent firms. The value derived forthis
scenarioshould represent a lower bound on thetrue value of the insurance,
sinceitrules out the possibility for firms to choose a value-maximizing
termination rule. The true value of PBGC insurance should lie between the
valuation bounds generated by these two models.
The models employed in this paper allow for an analysis and valuation of
pension insurance in a model in which plan termination is determined
endogenously. The models also offer a framework for studying corporate
pension funding and investment policy. The implications of these models
confirm and extend those of Bulow (1981) and Harrison and Sharpe (1932), who
analyzed pension funding strategies for plans with a given maturity date.
The next section presents a model of pension insurance. The valuation of
PBGC liabilities are derived for each scenario, risk-rated pension insurance
premium structures are considered, and optimal corporate financial policy is
examined. It is shown that a fund can be significantly underfunded before a
firm would find termination to be a profitable strategy.
Section II presents empirical estimates of the value of PBGC insurance for
a sample of Fortune 100 firms. The results of this Section indicate that the
pensionput has significant value for several firms, and that the true value
ofPBGC liabilities can differ substantially from the common measure of such—7-.
liabilities, which is accrued benefits less the sum of fund assets plus 30
percent of firm net worth. Finally, the empirical results are used to
evaluate the decrease in PBGC liabilities that would result from the
prohibitionof voluntary terminations by underfunded plans. Section III
concl udes.
I. A MODEL OF PENSION INSURANCE
A. Valuation of PBGC Pension Liabilities:Voluntary Termination
Forsimplicity, I will assume that all accrued benefits are vested and
fully insured by the PBGC.Infact, guaranteed benefits typicallyaccount for
between90 and 95percentof vested benefits, while approximately80 percent
ofaccrued benefits are vested (Amoroso, 1982). This simplification is
necessary to derive analytic solutions below; it should not affect the
qualitative properties of the solution.
Following Bulow, let A denotethe value of accrued benefits, F denote the
valueof assets in the pension fund and .3E denote the firm liability beyond
assets in the pension fund, i.e., 30 percent of net worth. F and E are
measured as market values, while A is the present valueof accrued benefits
calculated by discounting at the riskiess nominal interest rate. The benefits
represent an obligationwhich will be paidwith certainty, either bythefirm
or the PBGC.
At a termination, if the plan is sufficiently funded (F+.3E >A),the firm
gains F and transfers assets of value A to the PBGC. Otherwise, the firm is





Expression (2) highlights the nature of the firm's put option. Its net
pension liability is F-A; however, it can default on that obligation and
transfer its liability of A to the PBGC in return for only F+.3E.
There is no explicit maturity date associated with the insurance plan. In
this sense, it is isomorphic to an merican put option with infinite maturity
and exercise price A. Just as the put can be exercised only once, the firm
canvoluntarily terminate just one defined-benefit plan. Thereafter, it may
offerits employees only defined-contribution plans. These plans are akin to
mutualfunds. They neither require nor recieve PBGC insurance. Part of the
firm's problem will be to choose a rule for voluntary termination which, in
conjunction with its other policies, maximizes firmvalue.
To solve for the value of the pension insurance it isfirst necessary to
specifythe dynamics for accrued liabilities and the assets backing the plan.
These will differ from conventional specifications because of the effects of
firm contributions to the pension fund and the effects of new retirees and
deaths on the dynamics for P.
For convenience, use S to denote the sum ÷.3E.I will assume that S
follows the diffusion process
dS (Cs+as)Sdt +s5s
(3)
where is the rate of firm contributions into the pension fund net of
payments to retirees expressed as a fraction of S, and where is a
standarddrift term attributable to the normal rate of return on the pension
fundassets, F, andthe firmequity,E.50 will be positiveif firm-.9-
funding for accruing benefits exceeds payouts from the pension fund for
current retirees., In a steady state with no uncertainty, a constant interest
rate, and a constant number of retirees, the present value of accrued benefits
would be constant over time. A firm administering a fully funded plan could
withdrawinterest earnings from the plan to help it pay benefits to current
retirees and still maintain full funding. In this case, new contributions
intothe plan would fall short of payouts to retirees by the amount of the
interest earnings; C would be negative. In fact if 30 percent of the
firm's equity were not included in the assets hacking the fund, C would
equal the negative of the interest rate. irm contributions would fall short
of current payouts by interest earnings on fund assets, which as a fraction of
assets would simply be the interest rate.
The dynamics for A are more complicated. As a base case, consider a
situationin which none of the firm's employees h3ve yet retired and in which
no further pension benefits will accrue. If the interest rate, r, is
constant, then the present value of accrued benefits,A,which is the exercise
priceof the pension put, will increase at the constant proportional rate r.
The growth in the exercise price derives from the definition of A as a present
value, and differs from the more conventional situation in which the exercise
price is specified as a dollar amount.
If long-term interest rates are stochastic, then so will be the present
value of accrued benefits. Denote by the expected rate of return on a
bond with a payoff stream identical to that of accrued benefits. This will
also be the expected growth rate in the present value of al ready accrued
benefits.If interest rates were nonstochastic thenwould equal r.
Demographics also affect the evolution of A. Accrued benefits increase- -10-
when current workers increase their length of employment and decrease when
plan participants die or have benefits paid to them. In a steady state with
nouncertainty, and aconstant level of accruedbenefits, newly accruing
benefits plus the increase in the present value of already accrued benefits
would exactly offset the decrease in total accrued benefits due to retiree
deaths. Denoting the net growth rate in accrued benefits attributable to
demographic factors as CA, the total growth rate inAwould be CA+r. Thus
inthe steady state, C would equal -r andwould remain constant. The






Thestochastic component of ()isdue to uncertainty regarding long-term
interest rates and the future pattern of additional net accruals.I will
denote the correlation coefficient between dzA and dz5 as o.
Following the analysis in Merton (197), and letting P(A,S) denote the
value of the pension put, one can show that P must satisfy the partial
differential equation:
?AAAA





where subscripts on P denote partial derivatives and r denotes the rate of
return on instantaneously riskless bonds. Equation (5)lacksaterminvolving
calendar time because the put is of infinite riaturity (Merton, 1973). The
terms andhave effects analogous to those of (negative) proportional
dividends in the standard option pricing model (Smith, 1976).
The boundary conditions for ? are:
a) At a point of exercise of the put (i.e., termination of the plan), P=A-S.
b) The limit of P as S approaches infinity is zero.
c) The limit of P as A approaches zero is zero.—Il-.
d)The rule for voluntary exercising is chosen to maximize the value of the
option.7
Following the analysis of McDonald and Siegel (1932), the solution to (5)
can be shown to have the general form
P(A,S) =(1—K)(S/A)K (6)
where K is the ratio of SR at which the option is exercised. Equation (5)
will satisfy p.d.e. (5) for
cr 2 r1/2 r -c







a= aA + as2PaAaS
Theseconditions are derived by solving the quadratic equation which is
generated by substituting (5) into (5). Choosing K to maximize the value of
the option results in the condition
(7
Equation (6) gives the value of the PBGC insurance plan (under the
simplifying assumption of no bankruptcy). Given estimates of the parameters
in (6) and (7) one could assess the value of the insurance to the shareholders
of the firm. These values could serve as the basis for a risk-rated premium
structure. Two such structures are discussed below in Section D.
Equation (7) gives the condition for voluntary termination of the pension
plan. Second order conditions require that C<l. One must further restrict C
tobe negative since a feasible K* must be positive becauseand S are
always positive). Thus, C<O, which implies O<K*<l so that the put will be
exercised only for S<A, i.e., if fund assets plus 30 percent of net worth fall
below accrued benefits. Parameters which result in non-negative values for
would imply that the option would never be exercised.3_12
Equations (5) and (7) generalize the formula for the perpetual American
put option presented in Merton (1973). In the special case that A is
nonstochastic, that C=O and CA=_r (which offsets the growth in A due to
the time value of money and thereby causes the dollar value of the "exercise
price", A, to be constant), eequals-2r/a2 and (5) reduces to Merton's
equation (52).
A.1 Comparative Statics
It is possible, although tedious, to show analytically that the value of
the termination option increases with 0A and decreases with Cs.
Conversely, the ratio of S/A at which it is optimal to terminate falls with
CA and increases with C. The intuition for these results is
straightforward: when the gap between the growth rates of accrued benefits
and the assets backing those benefits (S =F.3E)increases, the expected
profits from a future exercise of the put option increase and the value of
waiting to exercise correspondingly increases. These results are illustrated
in Table 1, in which optimal ratios, K* =(S/A)*,for pension termination and
the value of the pension put are presented for various values of 0A and
C5 and for an interest rate of .10 and a variance rate of.05g. Recall
that the certainty equivalent drifts in A and S are respectively r +C and
r +C.
Therefore the parameters presented in Table 1. correspond to
combinations of sustained growth rates of -.08 to .06.
The put values in the second panel are calculated assuming that A =S=
1.0.Therefore these entries may be interpreted as the value of the pension
insurance as a fraction of total asset value when the pension put is exactly
at-the-money, i.e., when the total assets backing the pension fund
obligations equal the present value of those obligations. emember, however,—13-.
that this condition does not correspond to full funding of the pension fund
since S includes the contingent liability of the firm of .3E. Of course,
formula (6) could be used to generate actuarially fair values of the
insurance for any initial values of A and S.
The table demonstrates that the value of the termination put can be sub-
stantial. As a base case, the zero drift configuration of CA and
gives a pension put value of 18 percent of the value of accrued liabilities.
Therefore even fully funded plans (where funding includes the firm's
contingent liability of .3E) can pose significant risk to the PBGC. When Cr
+
Cs)is negative (i.e., when pension assets are being depleted because of




It is interesting to note that when CA =C
=0,e=O and the pension
put will never he terminated. In this case, the "exercise price," A, is:
growing at an expected rate equal to its cost of capital;: therefore, in
contrast to the standard put option, waiting to exercise does not impose a
time value of money cost.
The table also can be used to examine the effects of equal changes in
Cs and CA. Reading down the diagonals from top left to bottom right
demonstrates that the optimal voluntary termination ratio decreases for
larger (algebraic) values for these growth rates. The value of the pension
put correspondingly increases. These results derive from the effect of scale
on the termination decision. If a pension fund is increasing in size (large
positive CA,CS), then the dollar gain from a termination for any given
ratio of S/A islarger.If the fund is growing, itpaysto wait to
terminate, and the ratio S/A must be smaller to induce early termination.—11.—
Thus,one should expect termination decisions to be more frequent in
declining industries in which pension funds are shrinking. These results
alsocan be verified analytically: Equal (algebraic) increases in C and
C always increase the value of P(A, S) and lower the termination ratio, K*.
.2Corporatepension FundingPolicy
Bulow(1981) andHarrison and Sharpe (1982) examinepension funding
policyin a model with taxes and with an exogenous termination date. They
concludethat a firm should fund its plan either to the maximum or the
minimum level permitted. This razor's edge characteristic is also a property
of the voluntary termination model.
Toconfirm this point, compute the first and second derivatives of (A,S)




wherethe final form of equation (8) is obtainedby substituting for c from
(7). From (B), for any nonterminated plan (i.e., K<S/A), we have that
so that each dollar contributed reduces the insurance value by
less than 1 dollar, and by (9), each successive dollar contributed reduces
the insurance value by progressively smaller amounts. In contrast, the
marginal tax shield arising from contributions to the pension fund is
independent of the level of current funding (Black [1980], Tepper [1981]).—15—
Therefore, the firm will always be forced to a corner solution: t any
interior point, if one dollar of extra funding results in an incremental tax
shield which exceeds the marginal decrease in the value of pension insurance,
then so must the next dollar contribution and so on. Conversely, if
marginally decreased funding is optimal in the interior, then so must be
further decreases until some statutory limit is reached. See figure 1.
Bulow (1982) has argued that accrued benefits rather than projected
benefitsis the relevant variable for assessing corporate pension
liabilities. The approach taken in this paper leads to an intermediate
positionin this debate. Although it is true that at a termination, the
firm's liability is only accrued benefits, the model shows that in the
presence of PBGC insurance, projected benefits (as represented by CA)
influence the decision to terminate as well as the present values of both
°BGC and firm liabilities.
B. PBGC Liabilities with Termination Only at Bankruptcy
When the pension plan terminates only if the firm is bankrupt, the firm
loses the special put option conveyed by the current pension insurance
system. Instead, at bankruptcy, the PBGC simply assumes the pension fund.
The value of the PBGC liability will depend in general upon the exact
conditions which set off a bankruptcy.I will assume that bankruptcy is
declared when the value of the firm, V. falls below the present value of the
debt obligations of the firm where that value is computed under the
assumption that the obligations will be fully met. (This notion of debt,
rather than market value, is the appropriate one because limited liability
assures that the market value of debt can never exceed V). Although thisThe pension plan is terminated when S/A <K,
termination, the obligation of the PBGC equals A
termination, the insurance is worth P(A,S) .The
the termination point.
The present value of tax savings from pension funding increases with
funding, or, holding E fixed, with S. The present value of tax savings
is proportional to the level of funding.
The total increment to firm value is maximized at either the minimum
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value of insurance, P(A,s)
or at S =KA.
—S=(1—K)A.




definition of bankruptcy is at odds with the technical definition that a firm
fails to meet a coupon or principal payment, it still seems a usefulway to
model bankruptcy for the present purpose. Firms in practice have several
overlapping debt issues outstanding with associated sinking fund covenants
which would make the modelling of bankruptcy in a legal context exceedingly
complex and firm-specific. Economic insolvency is a more straightforward
approach.
Denoteby D the present value of debt obligations computed by discounting
at the riskless-in-tey,ns-of_default interest rate. Then insolvency occurs at
the first occurrence of V <D.t that moment, the PB'C inherits a net
liability of A - F,1o where F denotesthe value of the funds in the pension
plan.The PBGC's claim to 30 percent of firm net worth is irrelevant in this
instance, since at bankruptcy, when V<D, equity has no value.
To derive the value of thePBGC insurance, we proceedas 5efore. The










where 0F denotes the rate of contributions to the pension fund as a
fraction of F. In a nonstochastic steady state with a constant interest
rate, CF would equal —r. All fund earnings would be withdrawn to help pay
benefits to current retirees so that total fund assets would remain unchanged
over time. The covariances between the instantaneous rates of return on the
variables will be denoted bya, CDV' and So Ofl.
Letting PD,V,F,A) be the value of the PBC liabilities, one can show—17—
thatP must satisfy the p.d.e.






















CA)A- rP = 0
subject to the boundary conditions
a) P = A-F when 0 = V
b)the limit of P as V approaches infinity is zero
c) the limit of P as D approaches zero is zero
d) the limit of P as F and A approach zero is zero.
Thesolution to this equation is
P = AC D/V) - F(DIV)° (10)
where
1
K+ r,K2 9= Lg) -—--J
I
L+ rlL)22CA,2 L









and where the solution is valid for parameters which result in positive values
for o and-18-.
Optimal corporate pension funding policy in the hankruptcy-only model
resembles that in the voluntary termination model. The partial derivative of
P(D,V,F,A) with respect to the funding level, F, is simply -(DIV)9. which is
independent of F. Thus, we again obtain a razor's edge property: If /V is
sufficiently small, then the tax benefits of additional funding will dominate
thetransferof wealth to the PBGC and the firm will fund to the statutory
limit. Otherwise, minimal funding will be value-maximizing.
C.TheGeneral Case
A general treatment of PBGC insurance would allow for termination either
at the first occurrence of a voluntary termination point or at the first
occurrence of corporate bankruptcy. s a general rule, however, there is no
closed form solution for the value of PBGC pension insurance in this mixed
case. The difficulty arises from the effects of debt on the variance rate of
the firm's equity. Geske (197'fl has shown that the variance rate evolves
stochastically in this situation. Because the assets hacking pension
benefits, S, include 30 percent of firm net worth, Ginequation (5) could
no longer be taken as a fixed parameter, and the solution for the value of the
pension insurance consequently would need to be modified. This effect,
together with the fact that termination can result from either of two
conditions, appears to make a numerical solution technique necessary. Even
the numerical approach presents difficulties, however, since the problem would
involve four state variables: A, S, V, and 0.
Jotwithstanding these complications, equations (5) and (10) still can be
of use in valuing PBGC liabilities. (5) should be an upper bound on the value
of pension insurance, since that valuation formula was derived using the-.19—
termination rule which maximizes the value of the insurance. In contrast, the
terminationonly—at--bankruptcy model provides a lower bound on the value of
the insurance. ror firms that are financially healthy but which have severely
underfunded plans, (3) will be a close approximation to the true insurance
value.In contrast, for firms near bankruptcy, (10) will be fairly accurate.
tnpractice, underfunded plans are associated with financially troubled
firms. Therefore, the true value of the PBGC insurance falls somewhere in the
interior of the valuation bounds. The models provide some clues as to why
troubled firms should tend to maintain underfunded plans. One possibility is
that such firms have low marginal tax rates due to loss carry-forward
provisions, and therefore derive less tax benefit from pension funding.
Another explanation is that underfunding the pension plan represents a source
of implicit financing cheaper than that available in outside credit markets.
This advantage will be greatest for firms with the highest borrowing rates.
Finally, if bankruptcy causes the firm to forfeit the pension assets to the
?BGC, overfunding of the plan would create a potential ban'ruptcy cost to
which troubled firms would be more sensitive. This effect was made explicit
in Section B in which it was shown that firms with large values of 0/V will
find that minimal funding is value-maximizing.
0. Risk-Rated Premiums
Thevaluation equations derived in Sections A and B provide the present
valueof PBGC liabilities under different scenarios. They do not, however,
provide explicit means to calculate fair annual premium rates for pension
insurance. Because fund termination dates are stochastic, the premium annuity
which hasanex ante present value equal to the present value of 0BGC-20-
obligations cannot be easily calculated. One approach which might provide a
reasonable approximation to the fair premium rate would he to first calculate
the expected value of the time to termination, and then calculate the annuity
appropriate to the present value of PBGC obligations using a horizon equal to
the expected time until termination and an interest rate equal to that paid on
thefirm's outstanding debt.
different approach would require ex post settling up. t the start of
each period, the present value of PBGC obligations would be calculated. At
period end, that value would be recalculated,andthe firm would pay (or be
paid) the change in the value of PBGC liabilities. The advantage of this
scheme is that it eliminates most of the moral hazard problems involved in
prespecified rate structures. Any increase in risk would induce increased
premiums. The firm would always pay a fair price for its pension-put option
(or for its limited liability in the bankruptcy model) and would thus lose the
ability and the incentive to underfund at the expense of the PBG(.
II. Empirical Estimates
Pensions and Investment Age (July ii, 1933) reports pension fund
statistics derived from the 1982 annual reports of the Fortune 100 companies.
The survey includes pension fund assets, vested benefits, and the assumed
interest rate used to derive the present value of vested benefits. This
information can be used for this sample of firms.
The survey expresses pension fund assets as market values. The market
value of vested benefits can be approximated by multiplying the reported value
of benefits by the ratio of the plan's assumed interest rate to the actual
long-term market interest rate for 1932. This adjustment assumes that pension—21.—
benefitpayout streams have time paths similar to perpetuities. The average
rate on 30-year U.S. government obligations in 1982 was 12.76 percent. The
market value of equity is easily derived from stock market data at year-end
1982,and total firm value can he approximated as equity plus book value of
long-term debt.I will calculate the value of PBGC insurance for 3 scenarios:
a steady state scenario, for which there is no expected growth in pension fund
assetsor liabilities, a growth scenario, in which a 5 percent long-term
growth rate is assumed, and a declining industry scenario involving a negative
5 percent growth rate.
The remaining inputs required to estimate the value of ?BGCinsurance are
the variance and covariance rates onunderlying securities. Table 2 presents
thevalues assigned to these variables. These values are meant to be
reasonable guesses only. The low variance rates on A and 0 and high
correlation between the two reflect their similar natures as nominal
liabilities. The variance rates on firm value and pension fund assets compare
to a historical value for the SP50O of approximately .05 annually. The
variance rate for V is derived by unlevering the SP500 variance using a
debt-to-value ratio of 1/3 and then by doubling that variance to account for
the lack of diversification of a single stock relative to the index. The
variance rate on fund assets is set equal to that on the SP500. The fund is
probably less well diversified than the index but this effect is offset by
debt held in the fund.
Tables3a and 3b present estimates of the value of BGC insurance for 37
of the Fortune 1.00 firms. Thirteen observations were lost because of missing
data. Table 3a presents results based on the 12.75 precent yield on 30-year
T-bonds during 1982, while Table 35 uses a 10 percent interest rate. Columns.22...
I and 2 of the tables are the present value of vested benefits for each plan,
and the level of overfunding of each plan, respectively. 'olumns 3-S are the
ratios of the value of PBGC insurance to vested benefits for the voluntary
termination scenario and the bankruptcy-only scenario under the 3 assumptions
for the growth rate of the olan. These ratios can be interpreted as the
fraction of pension benefits which are financed (in present value terms) by
the PBGC. The ratios thus give a measure of the PBGC subsidy per dollar of
pension benefits.
The results in the appendices are consolidated in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4
presents summary statistics and Table 5 presents frequency distributions for
the insurance values. The most striking feature of the results is the
skewness of the insurance values, which is revealed in Table 5. Most plans
are sufficiently overfunded as to pose almost no termination risk to the
PBGC. However, a small number of "problem firms" derive considerable value
from the pension insurance. These tend to he the larger firms: the weighted
averages of the insurance values are substantially greater than the means. In
fact for the bankruptcy-only cases, the simple mean of the insurance values is
negative even for r =10percent while the weighted average is positive. The
negative values reflect my assumptions that if an overfurided plan terminates
because of firm bankruptcy, the PBGC inherits the plan surplus, and so can
have a negative liability.
As expected, PBGC liabilities are extremely sensitive to the interest rate
used in calculating vested benefits. Table 4 shows that insurance values in
the voluntary termination scenario are more than twice as large for a 10
percent interest rate as they are for the actual 1982 rate of 12.76 percent.
Average insurance values in the bankruptcy-only scenario become positive as—23—
the interest rate falls to 10 percent. This reflects the sharp increase in
thepresent value of benefits. The total underfunding of all underfunded
pension plans rises from $.48 billion to M.47billionas the interest rate
falls.
Consistent with the comparative statics results above, the value of
pension insurance tends to rise with the assumed growth rates in A, S and .
Insurancevalues in the voluntary termination scenario more than triple as
growth rates increase from -.05 to .05. As noted earlier, this tendency
reflects the effect of scale on insurance value. cor growing funds, firms can
increasethe insurance value by delaying termination until a larger dollar
gain can he realized.
The total values of PBGC insurance for the 87 firms are also presented in
Table 4.The magnitudes of these numbers are quite impressive. Total
insurancevalues for the voluntary termination scenario are between 1.25 and
3.6billion dollars using the 12.76 percent rate and between 3.8 and U)
billion dollars using a 10 percent rate. These values compare with PBGC
reserves for insured future benefits of only 1.14 billion (PBGC nnual
Report, fiscal year 1982). Therefore, if the option to terminate voluntarily
is to be taken seriously, the PBGC reserve calculations are wildly
optimistic. The insurance values for individual firms also differ from the
traditionalmeasure of underfunding (A-F-.3E) by wide margins, and highlight
thepitfalls of ignoring the option component of pension insurance in
assessing PBGC liabilities. The bankruptcy-only insurance values are, as
expected, far more favorable. In fact, for the higher interest rate, firms
are sufficiently overfunded to drive aggregate net liabilities below zero. As
interest rates decline, the ?BGC is again at great risk although even in this
case,—2 —
PBGCliabilities would be halved by a reform in ERIS prohibiting voluntary
termination. The steady state (zero growth) insurance value at a 10 percent
rate is Z2.54 billion. Keep in mind that these insurance values are summed
over only the 37 firms in the sample. PBGC liabilities for all insured firms
must be significantly greater.
III. Conclusion
This paper derives the value of PBGC pension insurance liabilities under
two scenarios of interest. The first scenario allows for voluntary plan
termination, which appears to be legal under current statutes. The second is
atermination only-at-bankruptcy scenario, which has beenproposed as a reform
to current law. Optimal pension fund financing decisions are examined;
extreme pension funding policies are shown to he optimal in both settings.
This result corroborates and generalizes those of earlier authors. inally,
empirical estimates of PBGC liabilities are derived. These show that a small
number of funds account for a large fraction of total prospective PB(C
liabilities, and that those total liabilities far exceed current reserves for
plan termination.—25—
Footnotes
1. "Pension Agency Asks Congress to Approve Rise in Premiums for One-Employer
Plans," The Wall Street Journal (May 20, 1982).
2. A put option gives its owner the right to sell to the issuer of the option
share of stock at a prespecified price (the exercise price) regardless of
the actual price of the stock. Thus, if the stock price, S, falls below
the exercise price, X, exercise of the option yields a profit of '<- S.
Similarly, PBGC insurance gives firms the right to "sell" the assets of
theplan plus 30 percent of net worth to the PBGC at a "price" equal to
the present value of pension liabilities. The gain to the firmequalsthe
pension liabilities it transfers to the PBGC less the assets the PBGC
acqUire s.
3.Bulow cites Chrysler as an example of a firm for which the potential costs
ofa termination could be large if it affected the willingness of the
government to participate in abail-outscheme for the company. Such
extremeexamples are probably rare, however.
'.Ifthe fund is overfunded, this equation implies that the firm receives
CA This might be unrealistic: Bulow and Scholes (1982) cite an example
of a terminating fund in which the surplus was split between the firm and
its employees. However, this issue is of limited relevance for this
paper. The PBGC is unconcerned with termination of overfunded plans and
presumably would not block the establishment of a new fund. Overfunded-25-
plansare not terminated in order to escape liablities and so fall outside
of the scope of this paper.
5.1 assumethat is constant. This assumption is necessary to derive
analyticsolutions below. However, it is unrealistic to the extent that
firms with underfunded plans are forced to increase funding rates.In
this case, C would be a function of the funding status, and would
evolvestochastically. Numerical techniques would he required to compute
the value of pension insurance.
6.I will treat as a constant. This treatment is appropriate when the
firm has no debt outstanding other than its pension liabilities (Geske,
1979). Thus, this specification issuitablefor the voluntary termination
model, but would need to he modified for the more general case in which
the firm can go bankrupt.1 will assume that no dividends are paid outby
the firm, and that all dividends received by the pension fund are
reinvested in the fund, so that aSmaybe equated with the expected rate
of return on the assets backing the pension liabilities.
7. This condition does not necessarily imply that the firm's goal is to
maximize the value of the pension option. It implies only that
conditional on other decisions, the termination rule is option-value
maximizing. For example, in some situations, tax considerations may lead
afirm to pursue pension funding policies that reduce the value of the
pension put. Nevertheless, the termination rule must maximize the value
of the put given that funding policy.—27-
8.The insurance policy could have infinite value in this case.or example,
for large 0A and C=0, the option would provide a claim on a payoff
that would be growing faster than the rate of interest. The value would
be infinite although the option would never be exercised. Obviously, one
would not observe values of (constant) and leadinq to these
singularcases.
9. Using a variance rate for S of .05 (which approximates the historical vari-
anceofthe SP 500), a variance rate for A of .01 and a correlation
coefficientof .1 yields a2 =.05+.01-2L1)L0005)1'2=.055. 1
rounded down to account for the fact that pension funds hold some debt in
their portfolios. The entries in Table 1 were not extremely sensitive to
changes in
10. According to this specification, the PBGC would gain by the bankruptcy of
afirm with an overfunded pension plan, since it wouldsimply inherit
ownershipof that plan. There seems to be some uncertainty as to the
proceduresthat actually would be followed in such a circumstance, since
in practice, bankrupt firms have had underfunded plans.
ii.Negativevalues for o or $ would indicate non-finite values for the
insurance.-28-
References
Vincent Amoroso. "Termination Insurance for Single-Employer Pension Plais:
Costs and Benefits," Transactions, Society of Actuaries 35 (1933), 71-83.
Fischer Black. "The Tax Consequences of Long-run Pension Policy." Financial
Analysts' Journal, (July-August 1980), 21-28.
Jeremy I. !3ulow. "Pension Funding and Investment Policy," Stanford University
mimeo, 193l.
"What Are Corporate Pension Liabilities," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, (August 1982), 435-452.
and Myron S. Scholes. "Who Owns the Assets in a ')efined Benefit
Pension Plan," N.B.E.R. Working Paper t'1. 924, 1982.
Myron S. Scholes and Peter Menell. "Economic Implications of ERIS,"
N.B.E.R. Working Paper o. 927, 1982.
Robert Geske. "The Valuation of Compound Options," Journal of inancia1
Economics, 7 (1979), 33—81.
J.Michael Harrison and William F. Sharpe. "Optimal Funding and tsset
Allocation forDefined-Benefit Pension Plans," NBER Working Paper No. 935,
1982.—28--
T.C. Langetieg, M.C. Findlay and L.F.J. da Motta. "Multiperiod Pension Plans
and ERISA," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 17 (November
1981), 603—631.
Alan Marcus and Israel Shaked. "The Valuation of FDIC Deposit Insurance:
Empirical Estimates Using the Options Pricing Framework," Boston Univeristy
School of Management Working Paper No. 21/82, 1982.
Luiz F.J. da Motta. "Multiperiod Contingent Claim Models with Stochastic
Exercise Prices: An Application to Pension Fund Liability Insurance and
Valuation of Firms," doctoral dissertation, University of Southern
California, 1979.
David Mayers and Clifford Smith. "Toward a Theory of Financial Contracts:
The Insurance Policy," University of Rochester mimeo, 1977.
Robert McDonald and Daniel Siegel. "The Value of Waiting to Invest,"
National Bureau for Economic Research Working Paper No. 1019, 1982.
Robert C. Merton. "The Theory of Rational Option Pricing," Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science, 4 (Spring 1973), 141—183.
_______"AnAnalytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and Loan
Guarantees," Journal of Banking and Finance, 1 (June 1977), 3—li.
Alicia H. Munnell. "Guaranteeing Private Pension Benefits: Potentially
Expensive Business," New England Economic Review (March/April 1982), 24—47.—29—
William F. Sharpe. "Corporate Pension Funding Policy," Journal of Financial
Economics, (1976), 183—193.
Clifford Smith. "Option Pricing:A Review," Journal of Financial Economics,
3 (1976), 3—51.
Howard B. Sosin. "On the Valuation of Federal Loan Guarantees to
Corporations," Journal of Finance 35 (December 1980), 1209—1221.
Irwin Tepper. "Taxation and Corporate Pension Policy," Journal of Finance 36
(March 1981), 1—13.
Jack L. Treynor. "The Principles of Corporate Pension Finance," Journal of
Finance, 32 (May 1977), 627—638.—30—
Table 1: Termination Ratios and Option Values
(a2 =.05,S0/A0 =1)
Optimal Exercise Ratio, K =(S/A)*
r+CA:—.08 —.06 —.04 —.02 0 .02 .04 .06
—.08 .69 .64 .58 .52 .44 .36 .28 .19
—.06 .72 .68 .62 .55 .48 .40 .31 .21
—.04 .75 .71 .66 .59 .52 .43 .34 .23
—.02 .78 .74 .69 .64 .56 .48 .38 .25
0 .80 .77 .73 .68 .61 .52 .42 .30
.02 .82 .79 .76 .72 .66 .58 .47 .37
.04 .83 .82 .79 .75 .70 .63 .53 .39
.06 .85 .84 .81 .78 .74 .68 .59 .46
Put Value
r+CA:
— .08 —.06 —.04 — .02 0 .02 .04 .05
—.08 .136 .162 .196 .238 .290 .356 .440 .549
—.06 .120 .144 .174 .214 .264 .328 .412 .523
—.04 .106 .126 .153 .189 .236 .298 .38k .494
-.02 .093 .110 J34 .165 .208 .266 .347 .461
0 .082 .097 .116 .143 .180 .233 .310 .423
.02 .073 .085 .101 .123 .154 .200 .270 .379
.04 .065 .075 .088 .106 .131 .169 .230 .330
.06 .058 .066 .077 .091 .111 .142 .191 .277—31—
Table 2: Assumptions Used to Compute Value of Insurance
Variance Rate (annual)
Fund liabilities, A .01
Fund assets, F .04
Assets ÷.3equity, S .04
Firm debt, D .01
Firm value, V .04
Correlation Matrix




0 .8 .1 n
V .1 .5 n .2
Notes: n —correlationcoefficient between these variables was not
necessary for calculationsPBGC Insurance Values: Interest Rate =12.76%
InsuranceValue as a Fraction of Vested Benefits
Voluntary Termination Bankruptcy—Only
3 growth scenarios 3 growth scenarios
Vested Over—
Company Benefitsfunding —.05 0 .05 -.05 0 .05
ulf&west 245. 132. 0.0005 0.0021 0.0116 -.0515.OoSB -.0898
hewlett—pack 230. 270. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0003
Ic indus 174. 103. 0.0036 0.0096 0.0297 —.1318 -.1559 -.1923
:itii 2909. 5481. 0.0 0.0 0.0004 0.0002 0.0009 0.0042
Intl paper 401. 560. 0.0002 0.0011 0.0075 —.0131 —.0232 -.0476
Itt 1039. 625. 0.0011 0.0040 0.0171 0.0 —.0011-.0050
J&Johnson 146. 218. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0001 0.0008
kerr—Mcgee 41. 85. 0.0 0.0 0.0001 -.0704 -.1103 -.1920
litton indus 290. 289. 0.0001 0.0007 0.0057 0.0013 0.0036 0.0119
lockheed 1228. 1296. 0.0100 0.0197 0.0454 —.0260 -.0404 .0701
ltv 1333. 115. 0.0694 0.0923 0.1355 0.0375 0.0419 0.0471
McderMott 311. 270. 0.0036 0.0094 0.0286 —.0066 -.0114 -.0230
Mcdonnell do 949. 1052. 0.0056 0.0127 0.0341 0.0002 0.0010 0.0051
330. 403. 0.0 0.0 0.0002 0.0002 0.0008 0.0044
Mobil 1315. 1ô43. 0.0001 0.0005 0.0045 -.0128 -.0222-.0444
Monsanto 803. 894. 0.0010 0.0036 0.0153 -.0001 —.0008 -.0040
Motorola 43. 146. 0.0 0.0 0.0 -.0011 —.0031 —.0120
nabisco 261. 77. 0.0 0.0002 0.0030 0.0093 0.0182 0.0405
pepsico 111. 172. 0.0 0.0 0.0001 —.0022 —.0050 —.0138
philip horn 195. 296. 0.0 0.0 0.0 —.0269 —.0447 -.0942
phillip3 pet 445. 648. 0.0 0.0001 0.0020 —.0114 —.0207 —.04:38
ralston pur. 81. 191. 0.0 0.0 0.0003 —.0530 —.0883 -.1o59
rjreynolds 391. 475. 0.0 0.0 0.0009 0.0006 0.0019 0.0078
rockwell mt 1322. 1436. 0.0030 0.0081 0.0257 —.0124 —.0210 —.0407
shell oil 715. 942. 0.0 0.0 0.0008 0.0 0.0003 0.0020
signal cos. 388. 322. 0.0006 0.0025 0.012a —.2o01 —.2994 -.3566
sperry 424. 618. 0.0011 0.0038 0.0157 -.0051 —.0101 -.0241
std oil cal 607. 584. 0.0 0.0 0.0005 0.0005 0.0018 0.0079
std oil md 848. 585. 0.0 0.0 0.0011 0.0034 0.0077 0.0206
std oil ohio 494. 516. 0.0 0.0 0.0005 —.0059 -.0107 —.0229
sun co 486. 524. 0.0001 0.0005 0.0048 —.1028 -.1374 -.1971
texaco 541. 632. 0.0 0.0 0.0009 0.0010 0.0015 0.0013
texas inst 81. 258. 0.0 0.0 0.0001 -.2154 —.3133 —.4965
tenneco 374. 322. 0.0 0.0001 0.0017 0.0004 0.0013 0.0064
trw 586. 550. 0.0010 0.0036 0.0157 —.2344 —.2782 -.3441
union carb 945. 787. 0.0011 0.0038 0.0164 0.0011 0.0032 0.0117
union oil ca 325. 389. 0.0 0.0 0.0010 —.0180 —.0299 -.0563
union pnucifi 10?. 112. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0019 0.0033 0.0052
united brand 136. 79. 0.0221 0.0370 0.0709 —.4958 —.5046 -.5158
us steel 5003. 2236. 0.0367 0.0551 0.0933 0.0019 0.0052. 0.0174
united tech 1205. 1650. 0.0024 0.006? 0.0224 —.3832 -.4526 —.5559
warner COMM 26. 38. 0.0 0.0 0.0 -.0172 -.0300 —.0601
westinghouse 1832. 883. 0.0085 0.0182 0.0448 0.0024 0.0061 0.0192
weyerhaeuser 296. 175. 0.0 0.0 0.0008 0.0018 0.0048 0.0161
xerox 557. 386. 0.0003 0.0015 0.0091 0.0051 0.0078 0.0119Table 3a:
PBGC Insurance Values: Interest Rate =12.76%
Insurance Value as a Fraction of Vested Benefits
Voluntary Termination Bankruptcy—Only
3 growth scenarios 3 growth scenarios
Vested Over—
Company Benefits funding —.05 0 .05 —.05 0 .05
allied 551. 259. 0.0080 0.0174 0.0436 0.0103 0.0145 0.0207
alcoa 1053. 322. 0.0064 0.0150 0.0401 0.020? 0.0299 0.045:3
aMer hess 37. 70. 0.0 0.0 0.0 —.1428 —.2015 —.3084
brands 239. 97. 0.0 0.0001 0.0022 0.0062 0.0130 0.0316
car 655. 247. 0.0259 0.0423 0.0785 0.0053 0.0o58 0.0050
an—busch 149. 165. 0.0 0.0 0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 mOOiS
042. 328. 0.0177 0.0317 0.0648 0.0143 0.0192' 0.0281
ashland oil 135. 205. 0.0002 0.0012 0.0078 —.1334 —.1831 -.2710
878. 635. 0.0 0.0001 0.0017 0.0029 0.0038 0.0040
beth steel 2472. —148. 0.1047 0.1284 0.1716 0.0811 0.1002 0.1288
hoeing 1140. 1261. 0.0021 0.0063 0.0219 0.0011 0.0030 0.0105
borden 150. 92. 0.0 0.0003 0.0033 0.0074 0.0133 0.0264
burroughs 348. 223. 0.0005 0.0021 0.0114 0.0063 0.0096 0.0149
caterpillar 1260. 733. 0.0032 0.0087 0.0278 0.0024 0.0025 0.0010
chrysler 2277. —329. 0.0942 0.1180 0.1616 0.1013 0.1249 0.1604
coastal 37. 71. 0.0 0.0001 0.0020 -.5738 —.6739 —.8214
coca—cola 139. 96. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0007 0.0022 0.0094
colg—palMol 211. 274. 0.0001 0.0005 0.0047 0.0015 0.0034 0.0085
cons foods 61. 80. 0.0 0.0 0.0003 0.0007 0.0011 0.0008
contl group 614. 304. 0.0088 0.0186 0.0455 -.0015 —.0034 -.0083
control data 120. 157. 0.0 0.0001 0.0019 —.4308 —.4975 —.5942
cpc intl 136. 17. 0,0 0.0 0.0008 0.0018 0.0051 0.0181
deere 569. 545. 0.0014 0.0046 0.0182 —.0035 -.0067 -.0154
digital eq 22. 151. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
dow cheM 655. 513. 0.0001 0.0005 0.0048 -.0129 -.0203 —.0360
dresser 326. 291. 0.0005 0.0023 0.0118 0.0037 0.0072 0.0151
du pont 3586. 4057. 0.0030 0.0080 0.0255 —.0337 —.0516 —.0878
east kodak 1276. 1466. 0.0 0.0001 0.0020 0.0001 0.0004 0.0026
exxon 1939. 2306. 0.0 0.0001 0.0012 0.0019 0.0041 0.0099
firestone 745. 256. 0.0177 0.0318 0.0651 0.0134 0.0231 0.0444
ford 4420. 2800. 0.0154 0.0281 0.0589 0.0059 0.0086 0.0127
get dynaMics 569, 726. 0.0016 0.0050 0.0187 0.0 0.0001 0.0012
gen elec 4208. 4474. 0.0004 0.0018 0.0102 0.0003 0.0011 0.0057
genfoods 397. 535. 0.0004 0.0017 0.0095 -.0059 —.0113 —.0258
gen Mills 221. 102. 0.0 0.0001 0.0019 0.0028 0.0071 0.0213
gen Motors 13195. 1237. 0.0216 0.0376 0.0739 0.0102 0.0203 0.0469
georia pac 97. 122. 0.0 0.0 0.0001 —.0319 —.0500 —.0879
getty oil 232. 255. 0.0 0.0 0.0006 0.0002 -.0003 -.0030
goodyear 983. 590. 0.0036 0.0097 0.0297 0.0081 0.0134 0.0238
wr grace 109. 240. 0.0 0.0 0.0007 —.1143 —.1703 —.2786
greyhound 656. 326. 0.0169 0.0303 0.0625 0.0111 0.0174 0.0291
gulf oil 1067. 856. 0.0005 0.0022 0.0116 0.0026 0.0037 0.0045PBGC Insurance Values: Interest Rate =10%
Insurance Value as a Fraction of Vested Benefits
Voluntary Termination Bankruptcy—Only
3 growth scenarios 3 growth scenarios
Vested Over—
Company Benefitsfunding —.05 0 .05 —.05 0 .05
j&Johnson 18'. 1??. 0.0 0.0 0.0005 0.0 0.0003 0.0044
kerr—Mc8ee 53. 73. 0.0 0.0 0.0018 .04o1 -.0267 -.1518
littonindus 370. 209. 0.0008 0.0043 0.0303 0.0029 0.0088 0.0361
lockheed 1567. 957• 0.0263 0.0481 0.1092 0.0016 0.0008 0059
ltv 1701. —253. 0.1445 0.1750 0.2422 0.1384 0.1598 0.1907
McderMott 397. 184. 0.0125 0.0288 0.0831 0.0151 0.0233 0.0.378
Mcdonnelldo 1211. 790. 0.016? 0.0347 0.0909 0.0006 0.0027 0.0185
3 421. 312. 0.0 0.0 0.0032 0.00050.00220.0161
MObil 1678. 1280. 0.0005 0.0032 0.0257 0.0032 0.0040 0.0014
Monsanto 1024. 673. 0.0044 0.0136 0.0554 0.0092 0.01:72 0.0352
Motorola 55. 134. 0.0 0.0 0.0004 .0002 —.0010.0002
nabisco 333. 5. 0.0002 0.0020 0.0216 0.01710.03580.0915
pepsico 141. 142. .0.0 0.0 0.0026 0.00380.007:3 0.0140
philipMorn 249. 242. 0.0 0.0 0.0015 -.0089.0169 -.0414
phillips pet 568. 525. 0.0001 0.0012 0.0153 0.000? 0.0 —.0069
rl;ton pun. 103. 169. 0.0 0.0001 0.0050 .0369 -.0658 '-.1425
rj reynolds 499. 36?. 0.0 0.0005 0.0099 0.0014 0.0051 0.0259
rockwell mt 1686. 1072. 0.01050.0252 0.0764 0.006?0.00980.0124
shell oil. 912. 745 0.0 0.0004 0.0086 0.0001 0.0008 0.0091
siqnal cos. 495. 215. 0.0031 0.0111 0.0502 —.1106 -.1304 -'.163?
sperry 542. 500. 0.0046 0.0140 0.054? 0.0037 0.0061 0.0087
stdoilcal 774. 417. 0.0 0.0002 0.0068 0.0012 0.0046 0.0256
std oil md 1082. 351. 0.0 0.0006 0.0112 0.0069 0.0174 0.0555
stdoilohio 630. 380. 0.0 0.00020.0071 0.0099 0.0160 0.0268
sun co 620. 390. 0.0006 0.0035 0.0272 —.0410 '05 -.0938
texaco 690. 483. 0.0 0.0004 0.0096 0.0080 0.0159 0.0367
texasinst 104. 235. 0.0 0.0 0.001? —.1722 —.2815 -.4535
tenneco 477. 219. 0.0001 0.0010 0.0148 0.0008 0.0034 0.0219
trw 747. 39 0.0046 0.0144 0.0571 —.1073 -.1310 -.1720
union carb 1206. 526. 0.0049 0.0152 0.0591 0.0023 0.0077 0.0.349
union oil ca .415. 299. 0.0 0.0005 0.0105 0.0018 0.0013 -'.0045
union pacifi 136. 83. 0.0 0.0 0.0012 0.0097 0.0191 0.0439
united brand 174. 41. 0.0529 0.0816 0.1512 —.1936 -.1977 -.20:34
ussteel 6384. 855. 0.0802 0.1115 0.182? 0.0037 0.0114 0.0467
united tech 1538. 1317. 0.0084 0.0213 0.0687 —.2328 -.2809 -.3610
warner co 33. 31. 0.0 0.0 0.0003 -.0028 -.0066 —.0211
westinghouse 2333. 3??. 0.0263 0.0496 0.1143 0.0046 0.0133 0.050?
weyerhaeuser 377. 94. 0.0 0.0004 0.0090 0.0036 0.0109 0.0443
xerox 711. 232. 0.0018 0.0076 0.0415 0.0211 0.0360 0.0690Table 3b:
PBGCInsuranceValues: Interest Rate102
InsuranceValueas a FractionofVested Benefits
Voluntary Termination Bankruptcy-Only
Vested over— 3 growth scenarios 3 growth scenarios
Coepany Benefitsfunding —.05 0 .05 —.050. .05
allied 703. 10?. 0.0252 0.0482 0.1125 0.0375 0.0571 0.0959
alcoa 1344. 31. 0.0225 0.0447 0.1088 0.0498 0.0752 0.1256
aner hess 47. 60. 0.0 0.0 0.0007 —.0947 —.1398 —.2349
anbrands 306. 30. 0.0001 0.0014 0.017? 0.0117 0.0266 0.0756
an can 836. 66. 0.0629 0.0934 0.1648 0.0551 0.0738 0.1052
an—busch 190. 124. 0.0 1.0001 0.0052 0.0093 0.0176 0.0377
araco 1074. 96. 0.0471 0.0756 0.145? 0.0459 0.06Th 0.1096
ashland oil 172. 168. 0.0014 0.0061 0.0355 —.0779 -.1119 —.1820
arco 1121. 392. 0.0001 0.0010 0.0146 0.0210 0.0346 0.0633
beth steel 3154. —830. 0.2078 0.2311 0.2880 0.1412 0.1791 0.2413
boeing 1455. 946. 0.0080 0.0209 0.0690 0.0024 0.0077 0.0329
borden 192. 50. 0.0003.0.0023 0.0224 0.0173 0.0334 0.0762
burroughs 445. 126. 0.0027 0.0101 0.0481 0.0236 0.0396 0.0747
caterpillar 1608. 385. 0.0121 0.0286 0.0840 0.0308 0.0462 0.0753
chrysler 2906. —958. 0.2013 0.2236 0.2803 0.1605 0.202? 0.2722
coastal 48. 60. 0.0001 0.0011 0.0149 —.3921 —.4694 —.5955
coca—cola 178. 5?. 0.0 0.0 0.0008 0.0014 0.0054 0.0292
coig-palnol 269. 216. 0.0006 0.0034 0.0264 0.0045 0.0112 0.0350
cons foods. 78. 63. 0.0 0.0001 0.0049 0.0061 0.0128 0.0314
contl group 783. 135.. 0.0269 .0.05040.1152 0.0398 0.0552 0.0816
control data 154. 123. 0.0001 0.0011 0.0150 -.2579 —.3035 —.3770
cpc intl 174. —21. 0.0 0.0004 0.0096 0.0034 0.0109 0.0480
deere 726. 388. 0.00590.0170 0.0623 0.012? 0.0208 0.0365
digital eq 28. 145. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0002 0.0018
doe chea 835. 333. 0.00060.0036 0.0279 0.0172 0.0247 0.0364
dresser 416. 201. 0.00280.0103 0.0481 0.0103 0.0216 0.0543
du pont 4576. 3067. 0.01040.0249 0.075? -.0045 -.0089 —.0232
east kodak 1628. 1114. 0.0001 0.0012 0.0156 0.0002 0.0011 0.0112
exxon 2474. 1771. 0.0 0.0007 0.011? 0.0054 0.0131 0.0390
firestone 951. 50. 0.04780.0765 0.1468 0.0260 0.0479 0.1035
ford 5640. 1580. 0.03990.0663 0.133? 0.024? 0.0406 0.0746
gen dynanics 726. 569. 0.00620.0172 0.061? 0.0001 0.0004 0.0062
gen dec 5370. 3312. 0.00220.0085 0.0432 0.000? 0.0031 0.0200
gen foods 507. 425. 0.00190.0078 0.0405 0.0046 0.0076 0.0113
gen sills 282. 41. 0.00010.0012 0.0161 0.0055 0.0152 0.0550
gen notors 16837. —2405. 0.060?0.0915 0.1640 0.0175 0.0377 0.1001
georia pac 124. 95. 0.0 0.0 0.0031 —.006? —.0126 —.0306
getty oil 295. 192. 0.0 0.0003 0.0077 0.0094 0.0176 0.0369
goodyear 1254. 319. 0.01340.0307 0.0873 0.0218 0.0389 0.0796
wr grace 139. 210. 0.0 0.0003 0.0079 —.0804 —.1260 —.2292
greyhound 837. 145. 0.04410.0717 0.140? 0.0290 0.0486 0.0926
gulf oil 1362. 561. 0.002?0.0102 0.0480 0.0172 0.0297 0.0575
gulflwest 312. 65. 0.002?0.0103 0.0490 0.0242 0.0290 0.033?
hewlett—pack 294. 206. 0.0 0.0 0.0014 0.0 0.0001 0.0019
it indus 222. 55. 0.01340.030? 0.0873 -.0155 —.0204 —.0310
ibs 3711. 4679. 0.0 0.0002 0.0059 0.0006 0.0026 0.0162
Intl paper 511. 450. 0.00130.0058 0.0348 0.0006 —.0003 -.0076
itt 1326. 338. 0.00530.0162 0.0620 0.029? 0.0441 0.0705—33-
Table 1.: Summary Statistics for the Value of PI3GC Insurance
Assumed growth
Rate: -.05 0 .O5




Vested Benefits .005 .015 .010 .023 .020 .053




Vested Benefits -.037 -.008 -.045-.005 -.050 -.0004
Weighted Average -.005 .015 -.006 .025 -.003 .052
Total Insurance Value:
Vol untary
termination Zbillion) 1.25 3.82 1.933.50 3.50 10.35
3ankruptcy-Onl y
(Zbillion) -0.45 1.53 -0.452.54 -0.27 3.29
Totallinderfunding of
UnderfundedPlans 0.48 4.47 0.484.47 0.48 4.47-3 1.-




























































A. Voluntary Termination Scenario
Insurance Value as





.001 -.01 20 19
.01 -.025 7 8













Fraction of Vested Benefits
-.6-0
0 - . 01
.01 - .025
.025 - .050
.050
10
0
0
.15
.20
Notes:1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Maximum
Maximum
Maximum
Maximum
Maximum
value
value
value
value
value
is
is
is
is
is
.21
.23
.29
.20
.27
l
0